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Moderator:
I. The Honorable Theodore V. Morrison, Jr.[*]
{1} The October 1996 issue of the New York University Law Review includes a work dealing with
deregulatory takings and breach of deregulatory contracts. Next October, the N.Y.U. Law Review will
contain a rebuttal, a response critiquing work done by J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel Spulber. This critique is
coauthored by William J. Baumol and Thomas W. Merrill. We are very fortunate here today to have that same
Thomas W. Merrill with us. Our participants this afternoon on the panel will go in that order. Lewis Powell
will discuss the propositions that the Telecommunications Act, and perhaps other current proposals for
restructuring the electric industry, will constitute either violations of the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment, a deregulatory contract or an implied contract, and perhaps other constitutional provisions such
as the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If he doesn't say that they do, he will probably raise
serious questions as to whether or not they might do that.
{2} Lewis Powell is an attorney with the firm of Hunton & Williams. He has had extensive experience in this
area representing GTE, which has already been mentioned and pretty well condemned here roundly by
[comments drowned out by laughter]. I don't buy into that. I think GTE is perfectly within its rights to assert

any constitutional protections it feels have been violated.
{3} Tom Merrill is the John Paul Stevens Professor of Law at Northwestern University and is counsel in the
law firm of Sidley & Austin. He does consulting work for them with regard to the interests of AT&T, so he
has two distinct interests represented here. Tom was born in Oklahoma. He was raised and attended college in
Iowa and then received his law degree from University of Chicago. He lives in the Chicago area with his wife
and three daughters. He has worked in the Department of Justice and the Solicitor General's office.
{4} I hope we will have a lively discussion between the two participants; we only have two, and I'm sure we
will. But we've had these kinds of issues peripherally, maybe more directly than that before the commission. I
don't want to be put in the position of asking questions because it might be interpreted as a point of view, and
I don't want to risk that. So please, when we finish, we hope you'll have some time for some pretty pointed
questions. Be as argumentative as you wish.
{5} Without further adieu, I give you Lewis Powell.

Lewis F. Powell, III [*]
Partner, Hunton & Williams
{6} I thought it might be best to jump start my remarks with a Jeopardy question. The category is this:
"Supposedly Knowledgeable, Supposedly Neutral, Telecommunications Regulator." The answer is: He
recently said
We were told by President Clinton, Vice President Gore and the Congress to do three things:
1. Keep basic local prices frozen as solid as polar ice;
2. Lower long distance prices; and
3. Connect all classrooms and clinics.[1]
The question is: "Who is Reed Hundt?"
{7} I nearly drove into a ditch on Interstate 64 this morning when I heard Chairman Hundt say this on NPR.
Freezing basic local rates as "solid as the polar ice" is the language that stuck most clearly in my memory. If
incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") want to summarize their problems with the FCC, they would
need to look no further than the words of Chairman Hundt himself. Notably absent from his pithy list of
objectives is any mention of universal service or of just compensation for LECs.
{8} I would submit to you, moreover, that Chairman Hundt's attitude appears to have infected the entire
process of the FCC's attempted implementation of the Act - particularly as reflected in its ill-advised August
8, 1996 First Report and Order. Though its core pricing provisions were stayed by the Eighth Circuit in
October 1996, the First Report and Order poisoned the well of public service commission deliberations in the
arbitration process last fall.[2] Until state commissions can purge this poison, whether through self-help, or
perhaps through medication prescribed by the federal courts, this is going to be a long and very contentious
process.
{9} No doubt, Chairman Hundt's three objectives are politically quite popular. But one may reasonably ask,
"Who is going to pay for this?" The economic stakes are huge. The policy implications are equally important,
and it is now abundantly clear that ILECs will fight unlawful and confiscatory pricing to protect their
legitimate property interests and universal service wherever necessary.

{10} As we all know, this is an acronym-rich environment. As an illustration of the perils of so-called
"deregulation" and the inherent risks of a 5th Amendment taking, I would like to introduce a new acronym to
the dialogue today. The acronym is "RIP." If you can endure a bit of suspense, I will tell you after a while
what that acronym means.
{11} Hunton & Williams has been privileged to be among several firms called on by GTE to help it through
the implementation of the Telecommunications Act. The process has been enormously arduous, not to
mention expensive.
{12} The burdens have fallen widely. They have fallen particularly hard on state commissions, which were
given almost no time in which to review reams of evidence about the costs involved and the prices that
various participants in the arbitration process thought would be appropriate. One has to hope that over time,
with more thoughtful deliberation -- both in state commissions and in federal courts -- the resulting prices
will be more fair to local carriers and more sensitive to the universal service implications.
{13} In case it is not already painfully obvious to you, I am an advocate, not an academic. I have a client, and
therefore a bias. I nonetheless submit that GTE and the other local exchange carriers have, by far, the more
compelling arguments on the central pricing and policy issues raised by the Act. If these arguments continue
to be brushed aside, ILECs will be the victims of massive deregulatory takings. The adverse consequences
will not only befall ILECs and their shareholders, but local infrastructure will deteriorate for want of new
investment, and universal service will be threatened.
{14}What exactly is a deregulatory taking? The article by Greg Sidak and Dan Spulber goes to great lengths
to discuss the history of regulatory and deregulatory takings.[3] My new friend Tom Merrill has now
published a response to the Sidak and Spulber piece. It's really not very complicated when you get right down
to it.
{15} I will offer you some citations to the record of this proceeding here today. Even Professor Merrill seems
to acknowledge the existence of the risk. In footnote 44 on page 1049 of his article, Merrill says,
{16} In this new world of local exchange service competition, if prices for network elements and access are
set at confiscatory levels then some LECs may suffer, indeed some may even go out of business. But if this
happens, others will immediately step in to take their place. Any constitutional infirmities and pricing levels
can be rectified by an action for damages after the fact without jeopardizing public services.[4]
{17} My second citation is to a document that I submitted for your reading pleasure. It is the Complaint that
GTE filed in federal court in Richmond against AT&T, MCI and the Virginia Commissioners, in their official
capacities, I hasten to add.
{18} In the wake of the Virginia State Corporation Commission's resolution of the arbitration late in the fall
of 1996, GTE felt obliged to file a federal lawsuit, suing the Commissioners in their official capacities, as
well as the long distance carriers. GTE alleged the prices that the commission had set were confiscatory exactly the kind of prices about which Tom Merrill spoke in footnote 44 of his article. The loop is the central
element of the network. It's the wire that runs from your house to the phone company's central office. GTE
sought a loop price of $36 a month. The commission set a loop price of only $19.16. The commission made a
decision with respect to the wholesale discount. The wholesale discount is a wholesale price at which GTE
will be obligated to sell retail services to long distance carriers. GTE currently offers these retail services only
to its end users. The wholesale discount the commission chose was considerably larger than that advocated by
GTE. If these decisions remain undisturbed, GTE is going to lose an enormous amount of money.
{19} The last citation I'll give you is to our prayer for relief which you will find on the very last page of our

Complaint. We asked the federal court to declare that GTE is entitled to a competitively neutral, nonbypassable end user surcharge to cover GTE's stranded costs. Stranded costs are those costs left uncovered as
the result of a deregulatory taking. [Stated another way, those are costs that are not covered by new prices
that follow regulatory action changing the rules in the middle of the game.] Stranded costs take several forms.
First and foremost, perhaps, the local carriers - GTE and the Bell Companies - have invested billions of
dollars in the local telephony network. This investment was predicated on the old understanding within the
regulatory framework that the LEC would recover those actual costs. Pricing such as that imposed by the
Virginia Commission will fall short of allowing LECs to recover these huge expenditures.
{20} There's another facet of stranded costs that may also prove significant -- ongoing and future costs. The
ILECs, after all, have statutory obligations to maintain and upgrade the existing networks. As the so called
"carriers of last resort," they bear the lion's share of the universal service burden. Those costs are going to be
substantial.
{21} Third, stranded costs may very well include the huge internal, implicit subsidies that currently exist in
the rate structure. The basic residential rate is way below the actual cost to Bell Atlantic of running and
maintaining the wire out to my house in rural Hanover County. The shortfall is covered by other services
which are priced well above cost. Most state commissions neglected to protect or replace those revenue
sources in last years arbitration decisions. Absent comprehensive rates rebalancing to allow prices to reflect
actual costs, a recovery mechanism must be implemented for LECs' huge subsidy costs.
{22} The LECs' position in all this is quite straight forward. They built the local network; they own it; they
are required to maintain it and to upgrade it. Now, the Congress says LECs must share it with their new
competitors. Well, that's fine so long as the pricing regime is compensatory. The problem for LECs like GTE
is that, thus far most commission arbitration decisions have not been fully compensatory. Indeed, as our
Complaint stated in full--in federal courts in Richmond and all over the country - the prices set have fallen far
short of being compensatory. We therefore anticipate substantial stranded costs, which must be covered in
some fashion or another.
{23} So, where do we go from here? As I indicated, the substantial economic stakes will continue to drive
this process forward. It will be a two-front battleground. The federal court actions are beginning. We are
engaged in initial federal skirmishes regarding issues such as jurisdiction and ripeness, but sooner or later
state commissions across the country are going to "approve" interconnection agreements reflecting the
arbitrated terms. At that point, these federal complaints will mature and GTE and other ILECs will begin
slugging it out with the long distance carriers in front of federal judges. At the same time, state commissions
are going forward with their follow-up permanent costing and pricing inquiries. State commissions and the
FCC will be addressing access charge reform and universal service. Consequently, the legal costs of this
process will continue unabated and may even increase in 1997 and 1998.
{24} How then, should state commissions resolve these daunting challenges? You will not be surprised to
learn that GTE has a solution in mind. First, the key to understanding is to focus on exactly where we will be
once interconnection begins. The title of the operative chapter in the Act is "Development of Competitive
Markets." The linchpin word, I would suggest to you, is not "competitive," but rather "development." The
reality is that once interconnection begins, we will not be in a truly competitive environment. The "GTE
proviso" that has attracted the attention of the long distance carriers is not a particularly surprising proviso
when you think about it. We call these things interconnection agreements or interconnection contracts. Of
course, it is not a contract in the sense in which we, as lawyers, are accustomed. It is not a voluntary meeting
of the minds. It is something that the local carriers are being forced to do. Fundamentally, it is this element of
governmental compulsion that implicates takings concerns.
{25} So if we will not be in competition, where will we be? My new telecommunications acronym, RIP, says

it all - we will be mired for some time in Regulation in Purgatory. The new Act creates an enormous
regulatory burden - hardly consistent with free and unfettered competition. Indeed, some have said they
thought that the Congress should perhaps have put a time line on the new Act, and that it should have a 15year sunset provision. The next decade and a half has been referred to as the "interim regime."
{26} In addition, Tom Merrill said it was important to seize the linguistic high ground. Competition, of
course, is good. It makes us feel warm and fuzzy; we like competition - it is very American. Monopoly is
bad, so monopolists must be flushed out and reformed. The mind set is that if the process of reformation is
crippling, so be it. Capitalism is relentlessly dynamic and, therefore, inherently messy.
{27} Long distance carriers are cleverly telling America that they will bring us competition. The ads are
already being run all over the country. Note that we have been bamboozled into calling AT&T, MCI, Sprint
and others the Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, or CLECs. Well, let's take a look at this and see whether
CLECs and the new Act will truly bring us competition as they promise. I assert that they will not, at least not
for a long time.
{28} Let's consider one important area of the landscape that looms ahead - resale. As you know, the Act
contemplates entry into the local market through two routes. Long distance carriers can lease bits and pieces
of the local network, one element at a time, and then form a new platform for service by either combining
leased elements with CLEC-provisioned facilities, or reassembling all the elements into their original
configuration. In the alternative, long distance carriers can purchase from the LECs the full retail service, but
at a wholesale discount, and then resell it to former LEC customers, presumably at a price lower than the
LEC's tariffed retail rate. Let's examine resale for a moment.
{29} As for telecommunication conditions prior to the Act, no wholesale level existed. A single ILEC (the
awful monopolist) had a straight line to the retail end users. State commissions stepped in to protect the retail
end users. Significantly, and this is often overlooked in the stampede toward competition, the commissions
also had to set all rates sufficient to cover the ILECs' costs and provide a reasonable rate of return to each
ILEC and its investors.

{30} Such was the state of affairs prior to the Act. It was very straightforward and uncomplicated. One local
exchange monopolist served all the retail end users, with no wholesale intermediary. Rates were regulated,
but hugely unbalanced in order to maintain low, uniform prices for basic phone service and protect the
financial viability of the LEC.
{31} We are now headed to Regulation in Purgatory in the resale context. Under the resale RIP regime, the
ILEC is required to sell to CLECs the same retail services that the ILEC offers to its end users, but at a
regulated, wholesale discount. I call this new market segment the "Wholesale RIP." The CLECs will turn
around and resell those services to retail end users, in "competition" among themselves and with the ILEC,
which of course will continue to have a retail market. I call this segment the "Retail RIP."

{32} You can call this new alignment whatever you like under the statute, but it is not competition as
economists understand it. At the newly-created wholesale level - the Wholesale RIP - the ILEC will not
voluntarily be selling these services to CLECs. It is a forced sale. CLECs, of course, can only shop at the lone
incumbent's store, so the new wholesale prices will be fixed by the regulators. At the retail level, CLECs will
not have any regulatory restraints on the prices that they may charge to end users, but the ILEC will remain
tightly yoked by regulated prices and continuing regulatory obligations - most notably, universal service. So
whenever someone suggests that the Act will introduce competition through resale, I would submit to you
that they are mistaken. Instead, the Act has consigned us to languish for many years in Regulation in
Purgatory.
{33} Thus, the first part of reaching a solution is understanding that we are not moving immediately into a

freely competitive environment. What, then, are the actual components of the solution? The challenge is for
commissions and federal courts to interpret the Act in a way that is true to the Act's purpose and that avoids
constitutional problems. This can be done without raising the specter of deregulatory takings, but doing so
requires a comprehensive solution.
{34} First, the prices at which CLECs are permitted to lease pieces of the ILEC's network must be fully
compensatory. They must be based on the ILEC's actual costs in the state in question, not the costs of some
hypothetical, as yet unbuilt, network or the costs yielded by some proxy model. Similarly, the wholesale
discount must be predicated on the retail costs an ILEC will in fact avoid through the new regime rather than
on assumptions that the ILEC will either abandon the retail market or achieve substantial savings.
{35} Second, commissions must devise and implement a universal service funding solution simultaneously
with implementation of the Act's other provisions. Universal service provides state commissions with a
terrific opportunity to solve much of this problem. Universal service, properly restructured and funded
consistent with the requirements of the Act, can help achieve the laudable objectives of the Act and do so on
a competitively neutral basis. Without a simultaneous universal service solution, cost-based pricing for
network elements and resale will inevitably strand substantial portions of the ILECs' historic and future
investment. Not only would this situation create unnecessary legal issues, it would also degrade the network
and cause deterioration of services to end users. Surely, the Congress could not have intended such a result.
{36} Another element of a comprehensive solution would be rate rebalancing. To go back to Tom
Krattenmaker's admonition to take care with our choice of words, we could say "Let's have honest rates for a
change. Let's have customers pay their fair share of the cost of the services they use." The needs of those
massive universal service funds could be shrunk considerably if we had genuine rate rebalancing.
{37} Changing the rules is fine, so long as reasonable investments made under the old regulations are not
stranded.
Thomas W. Merrill [*]
John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University
{38} Thanks, I appreciate the chance to come and speak to you today. Lewis told you that the constitutional
issues are not terribly complicated. In support of that he pointed to the Sidak and Spulber article[5] which is
150 pages long. I would point out that the article does not even discuss the intricacies of the
Telecommunications Act.[6] He then cited footnote 44 on page 23 of my article[7] and pages 34 and 65 of
GTE's complaints.[8] With all due respect, I think I would say that in fact it is somewhat complicated. The
constitutional issues raised by the Telecommunications Act are difficult questions; in many cases questions of
first impression that have not been addressed in any meaningful fashion by any court in this country at any
level. The application of those principles is also going to be a difficult one, and one that is going to have to be
sensitive to the nuances of the telecommunications industry and to the specifics of the Telecommunications
Act.
{39} We also heard a lot about Regulatory Purgatory, "RIP", and so forth. I will submit that overlaying the
system of forward-looking pricing, which the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and many State
Commissions have endorsed, with a series of hearings based on takings principles which have not yet been
defined, is not a way to get us out of Regulatory Purgatory. Rather, it will send us straight to Regulatory Hell.
So I guess in those points we are in disagreement.
{40} Why do I say this is constitutionally complicated? Because we are in essentially uncharted waters here
as to what the constitutional principles might be that would apply to these cases. GTE and other Incumbent

Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) that have raised the constitutional questions have relied on the Supreme
Court's takings cases in the public utility area. The Supreme Court had held for over 100 years that the
takings clause applies to public utility rate-making.[9] But the regulatory schemes involved in these decisions
are all very different from what we have in the Telecommunications Act in at least one very fundamental
respect. These schemes all pre-suppose a situation of a public utility operating in a natural monopoly
environment, where the main determinant of the stream of revenues that the company is going to earn being
the rate order that the Public Utilities Commission establishes for it. It is not an easy process, but in this
situation at least you can take the rate order and make some kind of prediction or extrapolation from the rate
order to determine the revenues that the utility is likely to earn. You can then use that revenue stream as a
basis for calculating whether or not the shareholders have been asked to assume an undue burden.
{41} Under the Telecommunications Act, in contrast, there is some regulation of rates that takes place.
However, we are now talking about carrier-to-carrier rates for specific unbundled network elements or for
services to be resold from wholesale rates or access charges, and so forth. The actual prices that the
communications carriers charge to customers (once the Act is fully implemented) will not be subject to
regulation but will be determined by competition. Under the Telecommunications Act there is no direct
relationship between any of these regulatory rate setting actions and the final revenue stream. This
relationship is the critical variable to ascertain to do any sort of takings analysis. In that respect I think the old
cases are very different. I don't think they are irrelevant; I think we can extrapolate some useful principles
from them. Nevertheless, we have to do some extrapolation. We can't simply apply them wholesale.
{42} Sidak and Spulber have also spoken at great length about what they have called the regulatory
"contract" or compact.[10] There has been some attempt, although not so much in actual litigation under the
Telecommunications Act, to invoke this breach of contract idea as a basis for restricting the pricing
provisions used to implement the Telecommunications Act. However, the regulatory contract idea, or at least
the authority for it, is also not directly apposite. Again, we have to do many heroic extensions from older
cases. Most of the Supreme Court cases that would be applicable are the cases from between the 1890's and
1920's that involve city franchise agreements.[11] Typically, the city had one company that provided gas
lighting, and then the city terminated that franchise and put in a franchise for electric lighting. Those cases
arise in a very different context than what we are talking about here. The more recent Winstar decision,[12]
which is often spoken about, also arises out of a different industry (the savings and loan industry) and
involved a very recent promise that was well understood by everyone. The decision was clearly abrogated by
the government and this had immediate and severe financial consequences. Again, the case is factually
distinguishable from the situation we have here, so we have to extrapolate rather heroically from these other
authorities in order to find out what the principles are that apply.
{43} Another complicating factor the Telecom Act regime sets up is a very complicated federal mechanism.
Somebody suggested this morning that it may violate the Tenth Amendment, and there may be some merit in
that suggestion. The Act proceeds with the general framework set up by the Congress. This is then
implemented by regulations issued by the FCC; then it goes to the State Commissions for particular pricing
decisions. It then goes back to federal district court, and who knows who is going to enforce the
implementation of the whole thing. All this morning's speakers emphasized these peculiarities. Think of how
that complicates any kind of takings or breach of contract analysis. Who do you sue, and when do you sue
them? Arguably, if this is a taking, GTE should have sued the United States government as soon as the Act
was passed. It was the United States Congress, I believe, which abrogated any exclusive territorial
understandings which mandated competition and so on and so forth. If the gravamen of the complaint goes to
those elements, perhaps the time when the suit should have been filed has already passed. Do you sue the
FCC because of its pricing regulations? Perhaps you do, but then the courts may decide that the issue is
premature since the pricing rules haven't been applied yet. Do you sue the State Commissions? Well, perhaps
you do, but the State Commissions can always say "Well, we're just following federal law, so it's really not us
that's doing this, it's the Feds that are making us do it." The federalism dimension complicates the issue and

makes it difficult to know exactly when and how the takings analysis or the breach of contract analysis
applies here.
{44} What are the constitutional principles that ought to apply in resolving these allegations? It is a lot easier
to say what they're not than what they are. Let me suggest a few things about what they are not. One thing
that neither the Fifth Amendment nor the regulatory contract idea supports is the notion that utilities like GTE
or other ILECs have a of guaranteed right to the continuation of the revenue stream that they enjoyed under
the prior system of regulation. There are passages in Sidak and Spulber that suggest that this is in fact some
kind of constitutional entitlement. But that just can't be. The whole system of utilities regulation that we have
had for decades in this country is premised on the idea that monopoly pricing can be legitimately regulated
and that we can try to eliminate any pricing based on monopoly power above what a hypothetical competitive
marketplace would generate. To the extent that the existing prices that utilities are charging contain monopoly
or super-competitive elements, it is obviously legitimate for the government to reduce the revenue stream to
that extent.
{45} The other thing we know is that if a utility suffers losses because of competition which comes about
through technological change, there is no constitutional complaint that can be made. There are several old
cases involving turnpike companies, for example, that go out of business because the railroad comes along.
[13] Other cases discuss the street electric railway company that goes out of business because people start
driving cars and taking internal combustion buses.[14] It is pretty clear from these cases that if a utility goes
out of business because it is in a business which has become obsolete, then there is no constitutional infirmity
there. Now, I am not suggesting these cases apply perfectly in this context; there are some distinctions.
However, the proposition suggested in these cases that there is some kind of constitutional entitlement to the
existing revenue stream is erroneous.
{46} The third thing we know for sure is there is no Constitutional right to a particular rate-making
methodology. There is a lot of language in the GTE complaint and elsewhere claiming that somehow their
real or actual costs have been ignored. What that really means is that the historic costs, the original
depreciated costs of a plant that they acquired, is something that they are constitutionally entitled to recover.
That is just not the case. The Supreme Court has said quite clearly that the Fifth Amendment takings clause
is, in effect, neutral as between rate making methods.[15] If regulators want to adopt the old fair value
approach, or if they want to adopt forward looking costs; there is nothing in the Constitution that prevents
that from happening. I don't think that there is any constitutional entitlement to recover historic costs.
{47} What the Constitution, in fact, does require is much more difficult to say. I think the way I would
extrapolate from the cases--this is an extrapolation we cannot know for sure--is that what is required is the
opportunity to earn a competitive return on investment in regulated assets. I think this extrapolation is being
very generous to the ILECs. The rate of return on investment should be determined by looking at investments
of roughly comparable risk in the marketplace and setting a return on investment according to that
benchmark. I think there is language in three or four of the Court's cases suggesting that this is the correct
constitutional standard. I also believe that one can extrapolate from that standard to the present context
without too much difficulty. Obviously, applying the standard is something else and raises many difficult
questions.
{48} Is the Telecommunications Act unconstitutional under this competitive return standard? The answer: I
don't have any idea. You don't either, and neither does Mr. Powell. The problem is, what are the revenues that
will be earned on regulated assets under the new regime? There are simply too many unanswered variables to
be able to tell at this point.
{49} One problem is stranded investment claims. People that raise these constitutional claims always bring
up the nuclear power plants and most, true to form, talk about the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO)

plant. Now, I'd be the last person to say that a system of competitive access that stranded a bunch of nuclear
power plants would not raise any constitutional questions. I think it probably would raise very serious
constitutional questions, but that does not mean that there are any nuclear power plants out there in the local
telephone exchange industry. In fact, it's not clear at this point in time that there will be very many, if any,
stranded plants. One problem is that if competitors rent facilities from local companies, as opposed to
building new facilities, there won't be a stranded plant. The plant in that situation is either going to be used by
the ILEC, or it's going to be rented to a Competitive Local Exchange Company (CLEC). Either way, it is not
stranded; somebody is using it. And if the rental prices are fair, as we think the forward-looking pricing of
Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC) is, then there won't be a stranded plant problem to that
extent.
{50} Another problem is that there is tremendous growth and demand for local telephone service right now,
as you all know. New services like Internet access, and perhaps video dial-tone in the near future, are going to
stimulate consumer demand even more. It is possible that the loss in market share that competition creates
will be offset by overall growth in the load on the system. Such an increase in system use will prevent
stranded plants.
{51} Finally, some of the telephone plant is fixed and immobile, like local copper wire loops. However, some
of it is re-deplorable to other applications or perhaps to other companies. It's not like there is a nuclear power
plant that you can't pick up and move from one state to another, and can't convert into something else. So you
have got some questions about the magnitude of stranded plant.
{52} Then you have questions about revenue sources. You can't just focus on the prices charged for carrierto-carrier access or for unbundled network elements or for purchases at wholesale for retail. That's just a
small part of the picture. You also have to look at other things. You have to look at the inter-exchange access
fees about which the Commission is ready to issue some major regulatory proceedings. You have to look at
the universal access charges that we have heard so much about. These are sources of revenue that have to be
factored into the equation to determine what the total revenue picture for the ILECs is going to be after the
Act is implemented.
{53} Additionally, I would submit that, at least to a degree, we have to look at some new sources of revenue
that ILECs will gain access to, as a quid pro quo for local competition. The whole act is structured as a sort of
large bargain whereby the ILECs submit to competition in the local arena. In return, the line of business
restrictions are lifted, and they get into equipment manufacturing and inter-exchange service. To some extent
the revenues that they can earn by getting in to these other markets are attributable to the regulated local plant
because of network externalities. Those additional revenues ought to be counted into the equation too.
{54} Finally, we don't know what the revenues are going to be because we have to look at some
imponderables, such as consumer loyalty and how much consumers are going to value one-stop shopping. In
the end, the revenues are really a function of how well the ILECs compete and what quality of service they
provide.
{55} All of these things are things that we obviously cannot know at this point in time. Nobody really knows
what the revenue impact of the statute will be. There are many reasons to think that in the
telecommunications industry, as opposed to the electric utility industry, for example, the stranded plant
problem may be much less severe and may be rather minor in the larger picture.
{56} All this leads to the one point that I hope you would take away from this and which has to do with the
nature of the remedy here for the constitutional violations that are alleged. I think this is really the core of the
difference between Lewis and me, or between GTE and the position of some of the competitive carriers. At
what point in time are we going to do this analysis and what will the remedy be? GTE is effectively arguing

that the constitutional analysis has to be done now, and it has to be done in such a way as to avoid the
possibility of any constitutional takings or breach of contract argument arising in the future. I would submit
to you that the correct answer is that the constitutional analysis should be done after the Act is fully
implemented because only then will we know whether, in fact, there has been a constitutional violation. I
would reinforce this point by suggesting that you look at the nature of the constitutional right at issue here.
The constitutional right is not an absolute right of property, nor is it an absolute right to do business as a
utility. There is no such thing. It is a right to just compensation if property is taken by the government. It is a
right to be paid if the government decides it is necessary to take your property in the public interest. This
right can be fully vindicated after the Act is implemented. We are not going to know whether or not that right
has been violated until the Act is fully implemented. Moreover, it would be wrong to interfere with the
implementation of the Act now by jiggering prices in order to avoid this Constitutional issue, if the effect of
the jiggering would be to undermine the implementation of the Act and the achievement of the goals the
Congress has set forth.
{57} It is really a basic principle of takings law that if the government declares the need to take property for
the public interest or the public use, the government has a right to go ahead and do that, provided it is going
to pay compensation after the fact. In this sense, GTE is really in no different situation from the owner of
land who has the land taken for a highway, let's say, and the owner complains that too much land is being
taken for the government's purpose and that this will force the owner out of business. The remedy in that
situation is not to stop the construction of the highway, bring in the engineers to testify in court as to how
much land it really needs, and let the court decide the issue. The remedy is to let the government complete the
taking, complete the project as it sees fit; and then provide just compensation after the fact to the landowner.
The same basic principle ought to apply under the Telecommunications Act. Most economists, the FCC, and
most State Commissioners think we need forward-looking pricing in order to effectively implement the local
competition provisions. They think that is consistent with Congress' purposes. Therefore, we should have
forward-looking pricing, and we should go ahead and implement the Act on that basis. If it turns out there's a
taking because forward-looking pricing and competition deprive the incumbent local carriers of a competitive
return on their investment, then they should be compensated appropriately at that time. How should they be
compensated? It is my personal view that the best thing would be for them to file suit in a federal claims court
under the Tucker Act[16] against the United States Government and have the United States taxpayers pay for
any takings that this Act happens to entail. That would spread the burden most widely and most equitably; it
would insure that the purposes of the Act are not frustrated; and it would respect the full scope of the
constitutional rights that the ILECs have at stake. Thank You.
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